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…we should focus on security as a pervasive and complex system of political, social,
and economic power, which reaches from the most private spaces of being to the vast
flows and conflicts of geopolitics and global economic circulation.
-Anthony Burke, “Aporias of Security”1
Over the past ten years, the concept of national security has been at the centre of a range of complex debates
and controversies in International Studies and in Foreign Policy Analysis. Both the post-cold war moment
and the intensification of processes of globalization have provided contexts in which a number of approaches
have questioned and re-examined the basic parameters of security and its status as a key, if often
unproblematized, concept in the discipline. From a range of different directions, new approaches to or
conceptualizations of security have emerged in analysis of foreign policy which have framed themselves
around a new vocabulary of ‘securitization,’ human security or critical security studies. The most critical edge
of this debate has been occupied by a research agenda focused around ‘critical geopolitics.’ Emerging from
different strands of post-structuralist analysis in International Relations (IR), Feminism and Political
Geography, critical geopolitics has effectively pursued a discursive approach to security and an analysis
which situates foreign policy as a source of national/state identity made possible within discourses of
identity/difference. This has contributed greatly to highlighting the ‘constructedness’ of an object — security
— which was often left outside of the reach of critical analysis or interrogation. One of the most far-reaching
claims — and successes — of this approach of critical geopolitics has been an attempt to connect foreign
policy analysis, and IR more generally, to broader strands in critical and cultural theory; a divide which has
been, accordingly, emblematic of a discipline often viewed as parochial, self-referential and overly narrow.2
On one hand, critical geopolitics has usefully brought questions of foreign policy and security into
broader contact with some strands of cultural or critical theory by bringing foreign policy into dialogue with
approaches from anthropology, geography, and cultural analysis. On the other hand, however, critical
geopolitics has cultivated only limited contact with disciplines that are primarily concerned with the
‘economic’. Although political economy was one of the early participants in the emergence of a critical
geopolitics agenda, there has been less recent dialogue between critical geopolitics and a whole range of new
critical, cultural, or sociological approaches to the question of economic or commercial life, including,
especially, the emerging field of cultural economy. This dissonance seems particularly striking given the
range of possible affinities between critical geopolitics and a form of analysis — cultural economy — which
seeks, like critical geopolitics once did, to bring an object often immune to cultural analysis (the ‘economy’)
into contact with new and innovative forms of critical assessment.
The objective of this paper is to contribute to one line along which a connection might usefully be
forged between critical geopolitics and the kinds of economic analysis made possible with/through cultural
economy. This line of connection, I argue in this paper, could be traced through a particular kind of analysis
of economic citizenship.  Shifting definitions of everyday economic citizenship, like shifting discourses of
foreign policy, often hinge upon the question of risk. In both historical and contemporary moments over the
past century, everyday economic citizenship, especially in the American context, has often attempted to locate
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individuals directly in economic contexts as direct bearers of particular forms of risk. Although given a
particular kind of force in the context of globalizing financial markets, this citizenship-risk connection has
long been a key feature of forms of everyday economic conduct. This individual risk, so central to
conceptions of economic citizenship, has not, however, been separate from or outside of the risk nations bear
in geopolitical space. The main point of this paper argues that, in many respects, the risks individuals are
asked to bear in everyday economic life (risks that are often situated at the centre of effective forms of
individual self-government) have often been deeply implicated in the ways in which the nation secures/bears
itself in the context of geopolitical danger. At the core of many forms of economic citizenship, I will argue,
is a connection (a deep mutual implication) between the risk individuals face in the spaces of the market and
the risks confronting nations/states in geopolitical space — forms of risk that are constitutive of both citizen
and nation. In this way, I suggest, the construction of the nation relies not only on discourses of
identity/difference which demarcate an ‘inside’ form an ‘outside’ in the performance of national security. The
construction of nation, a concern central to critical geopolitics, is also deeply reliant on the constitution of
citizens capable of bearing individual risk and, in so doing, making themselves active in the securing of the
nation.
To accomplish an analysis in these terms this paper is divided into three main parts. A first section
briefly reviews some of the territory of critical geopolitics as an innovative approach to foreign policy which
has provoked critical assessments of national security as a practice deeply implicated in the constitution of
national/state identity and in discourses of identity/difference. A second section briefly highlights cultural
economy as an approach which occupies a terrain analogous to critical geopolitics in its attempt to train
critical attention onto an object often conceived as an  already-existing or unproblematic category; the space
of the economy. A third and longer section reviews a series of examples from campaigns of ‘popular finance’
from over the past 150 years — more or less organized campaigns committed to encouraging prudent
financial, saving and investing practices among everyday, popular or working class populations. Examples
from these diverse campaigns usefully highlight the connections that have often been sought between
individual and national security. These connections, this section argues, hinge on a kind of mutual implication
of the risks encountered and confronted by individuals in the spaces of private markets with the risks nations
confront in geopolitical space; risks constitutive of both citizen and national/state identity. A conclusion
reviews these suggestive connections between cultural economy and critical geopolitics and stakes out some
of the ways in which research questions connecting the two approaches could be developed further.
Critical Geopolitics
Over the past ten or fifteen years several strands of foreign policy analysis have attempted to subject the
concept of security to critical attention and disruptions. The ‘critical geopolitics’ approach has been central
to these attempts to assess and interrogate security not as an already-existing reality, but as a form of
geopolitical reasoning. A key objective, argues John Agnew, is “to open up the traditional terminology by
exposing it as anything other than natural or innocent.”3  Drawing upon a range of approaches relating to post-
structuralism, feminism, and cultural studies, critical geopolitics has attempted to situate security at the centre
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of forms of power/knowledge which themselves are deeply implicated in the construction of political
identities. David Campbell, for example, has developed an important analysis of the politics of identity in
American foreign policy.  For Campbell, drawing upon the work of William Connolly and others, a key effect
of American foreign policy is the constitution and stabilization of American identity. In Campbell’s
configuration, identity is a fundamental, if highly contested condition of political, economic, and social life.
No space, body, or category has a natural or unproblematic identity. Rather the identity of all bodies is
constituted in language, discourse and in complex practices which constantly perform and enunciate its basic
contours.4
For Campbell, however, the identity of all bodies is performed not in any completely arbitrary
manner, but often in relation to and as a confrontation with difference. American identity marks itself
(especially, in a particular way, in the discourses of foreign policy) by demarcating itself against an external
space of estranged otherness. All bodies constitute themselves and invest themselves with meaning and
identity (render themselves identifiable in a particular kind of way) by sharpening a line between themselves
and what they are not and by invigorating themselves against contrasting otherness and opposition. “The
definition of difference,” notes William Connolly, “is a requirement built into the logic of identity, and the
construction of otherness is a temptation that readily insinuates itself into that logic.”5  In this formulation
identity and difference form an often unacknowledged yet inextricable dialogue (a domain of
identity/difference) in which each (re)constitutes the other:
Identity is an inescapable dimension of being. No body could be without it. Inescapable as
it is, identity-whether personal or collective- is not fixed by nature, given by God, or planned
by intentional behaviour. Rather, identity is constituted in relation to difference...Whether
we are talking of ‘the body’ or ‘the state’ or of particular bodies and states, the identity of
each is performatively constituted. Moreover, the constitution of identity is achieved through
the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an ‘inside’ from an ‘outside’, a ‘self’
from an ‘other’, a ‘domestic’ from a ‘foreign.’6
Critical geopolitics focuses not on the conventional logistical assessments of security threat and
danger, but rather on the practices and processes through which that danger is constructed and represented
as danger/risk in the first place. This refers to the pursuit of what Shapiro has called a kind of
‘anthropological’ stance (or a ‘reverse ethnology’) in which in/security is assessed not in objective terms (in
terms of how borders may be defended or transgressed) but with respect to how those dangers are represented
and how they serve to define state/national identity in particular ways.  Particular attention, according to
Shapiro, needs to be paid to constructions of danger (in official discourses, popular culture, media
representations) which demarcate relations of self/other, inside/outside and domestic/foreign. This approach,
claims Shapiro, “is aimed first at disclosing how representations of alterity (dangerous others) reproduce the
identities and spaces that give nation-states and nations in general their coherence.”7
Security is particularly central to this process of identity-formation. The definition of American state
identity, for example, in terms of an exceptional mission dedicated in a unique manner to international
intervention and responsibility, is partially made possible in and through a discourse which conceives of the
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space beyond American borders as a site of danger, threat, risk and insecurity. It is the danger and insecurity
that American foreign policy imagines and pictures outside of American borders (and as emanating from sites
of difference) that most forcefully serves to reinscribe ideas of America and the identity of American
exceptionalism.8  These discourses which sketche global space in terms of danger and insecurity
simultaneously establish the boundary between inside (specified in terms of order) and outside (often
described in terms of anarchy, war, or conflict). “Insecurity,” write Weldes et al., “is the product of processes
of identity construction in which the self and the other, or multiple others, are constituted.”9  In contrast to
conventional approaches to global politics and foreign policy, insecurity and danger are not automatically
understood as threats to the internal integrity of the nation, but are discursive materials from which that
national body itself gains identity and definition. “The constant articulation of danger through foreign policy,”
attests Campbell, “is thus not a threat to a state’s identity or existence: it is its condition of possibility.”10
Perhaps the most striking achievement of this critical approach has been the space it has opened in
which a range of concepts central to geopolitical reasoning — security, danger, geopolitics — can be subject
to novel and critical forms of examination. The dangers, risks, and emergencies which form the basic
vocabulary of foreign policy are not left unexamined as given or self-evident claims, but are unsettled as
discourses deployed for specific purposes in the construction of particular political, social, or cultural spaces
and identities. What has been less developed within the critical geopolitics literature, however, has been the
connection between this risk and danger experienced at the level of geopolitical space and the forms of risk
increasingly central to global and local economic spaces. Although economic and geo-economic fields have
been important to critical geopolitics in some ways, little attention has been focused on the risks associated
with (and constitutive of) economic spaces and identities.11  As Dodds suggests, “future research in critical
geopolitics…will undoubtedly be concerned with…the dangers and vulnerabilities that appear emblematic
of global capitalism.”12  It is precisely to this concern, to the connection between critical geopolitics and the
‘dangers and vulnerabilities’ of global economic life, that cultural economy can contribute.
Cultural Economy
One approach to the economic which shares with critical geopolitics a scepticism of received or unquestioned
categories, is an emerging research agenda organized around the concept of cultural economy. Cultural
economy has emerged as a critical concept that can be used to focus analyses which stress the ‘cultural’
constitution/construction of ‘economic’ identities, spaces and processes; all of the diverse processes, agents
and systems that have come to exist as ‘economic.’13  Cultural economy aims to interrogate the ‘cultural’
construction of the economic and of ‘economically relevant activity.’ Contrary to its self-image as a material
and naturally-existing category, the economic is treated in this approach as a ‘constructed’ realm and as a site
constituted in a range of practices, knowledges and discourses. Before ‘economic’ persons or processes can
be governed, they must first be represented and constituted in particular ways.
In more specific terms, a cultural economy approach foregrounds the ways in which one set of
practices which often have a role in defining and constituting the economic are those practices assigned to
or defined as ‘cultural.’ Although often defined or named as a part of a separate ‘cultural’ sphere, many
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cultural practices make visible, help define, muse about, or bear upon the economic, changing definitions of
economic activity and shifting configurations of economic space, conduct, and identity. Cultural economy
reconceives of the economic not as a material or naturally-existing ‘reality’ but as a constructed realm and
as a site of practices discursively constituted at a range of locations, including those formally assigned to or
categorized in the ‘cultural’ domain itself:
This particular understanding of economics as ‘culture’ focuses attention on the practical
ways in which ‘economically relevant activity’ is performed and enacted. It serves to show,
in other words, the ways in which the ‘making up’ or ‘construction’ of economic realities
is undertaken and achieved; how those activities, objects and persons we categorize as
‘economic’ are built up or assembled from a number of parts, many of them supplied by the
discipline of economics but many drawn from other sources, including, of course, forms of
ostensibly noneconomic cultural practice.14
In this pursuit, cultural economy shares with critical geopolitics a concern to disrupt the status of a
key concept — ‘economy’ and ‘security’ respectively — as an already-existing or unproblematic category.
In both cases these objects, ‘economy,’ ‘security,’ are not already-existing, but are categories themselves, the
‘making up’ of which requires explanation. Economy and security share a status, in these critical
interventions, as categories that are both central to the politics of contemporary social and cultural life, but
which also remain relatively unexamined and unquestioned. At another level, however, economy and security
also occupy an additional important point of connection; a shared preoccupation with the peculiar and
constitutive force of ‘risk.’
Individual/Geopolitical Risk
Like the state bodies that occupy geopolitical space, risk is also central to the ‘making up’ of economic
citizens. Throughout the twentieth century, especially in the American context, one of the key ways in which
everyday forms of economic citizenship have been framed is in terms of individual exposure to risk. Various
attempts to cultivate or ‘make up’ economic citizens have often required or asked citizens to locate
themselves directly in economic or market contexts or to expose themselves in some direct fashion to the risk
of market spaces. This citizenship/risk connection has been a particularly key aspect of recent processes of
globalization and ‘risk society’ in which individuals come to experience risk in an increasingly direct and
unmediated fashion. Much of the marketing and ‘culture’ of the world of personal finance, for example,
increasingly asks individuals to take direct control of their financial/investing life and to assume the risk of
that world directly. E-trade, and other direct investing services, frequently promote themselves in terms of
individual control over financial life and its associated risks:
In this kind of market hire the most cunning, goal-oriented, financial mercenary you can
find.
You’d be perfect.15
Modes of economic citizenship which ask individuals to locate themselves directly in economic spaces, and
to assume the risks of those spaces, however, have not only been central to recent neo-liberal trajectories, but
have been characteristic of a more persistent line of economic citizenship throughout the twentieth century.
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Writing in 1925, a moment which witnessed a dramatic increase in ‘popular’ involvement in equity and
security markets, William Ransom developed an argument which links popular forms of share-holding with
greater exposure to the risks of economic life. Because it facilitates direct ownership in productive enterprise,
the popular ownership of securities could, argues Ransom, provoke a more democratic form of citizenship
by providing direct experience of the risks and ‘hazards’ of economic life. “Small-investor ownership,”
argued Ransom, “seems to be the basic and important thing in America…if each small investor is encouraged
to...gain an owner’s sense of interest in the conditions and risks affecting at least several of the industries of
the country.”16
Throughout the entire postwar period, in addition, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) developed
a range of special educational, public service and marketing programs designed to encourage everyday or
working class populations to occupy a more direct stake in the economy. Echoing Ransom’s call for an
‘owner’s sense of interest,’ the NYSE conceived of broad share-ownership as the very core of a special
American economy which situated everyday citizens in a direct relation to risk and, in so doing, allowed
individuals to occupy economic space in a direct and unmediated manner. “Since the end of World War II,”
summarizes one former NYSE President, “this country’s economic growth has been uniquely fuelled by the
willingness of individual Americans to risk at least part of their savings in equity investments and to acquire
a direct personal stake in the performance of our private enterprise economy.”17
This individualized risk so central to forms of economic citizenship has not, in any simple way,
however, been separate from or located outside of the space of national security and geopolitical danger. At
a number of levels, the individual risk which constitutes economic citizens has been deeply implicated in
formulations of national security. At one level, the images around which programs of economic citizenship
were promoted often mobilized geopolitical risk in ways that not only identify an external threat but also
reinforce ideas about domestic identity, values, and culture. The marketing of programs of popular finance
mobilize images of ‘foreign’ space, ‘otherness’ or geopolitical danger as a way to more clearly define and
reiterate the contours of national identity. The various war financing campaigns across the United States,
Canada, and the United Kingdom, for example, constitute a most obvious effort to connect popular finance
to a sense of nation framed in terms of and out of geopolitical danger. The Canadian campaigns, for example,
consistently depict participation in war bond initiatives as a literal act of investment in the nation; an act made
necessary by events and threats emanating from the external/international realm. International space, often
framed as dark and only half-intelligible, is not only a source of threat and risk but also a key force requiring
the reassertion of national identity. In the context of external threat (and in its most oblique moment of war)
the reassertion of national values, identity and space is made even more urgent. As one sales kit from the
Canadian World War II Victory Bond campaign instructs, the presence of Nazi atrocities and threat is a
source of endangerment to Canadian values and yet can only be met by manifestations of those particularly
Canadian values of nobility and freedom. “If we don't do this,” the sales kit affirms referring to investment
in victory bonds, “one thing that is likely to happen is that we shall never again have the opportunity to make
our own decisions...You and I are making our choice between freedom and Nazi slavery.”18
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This connection is also frequently developed in American campaigns. Much of the advice and
advertising targeted to everyday investors (especially in terms of the US Savings Bonds program) diagram
American identity in terms of America’s unique location in global space. Figure 1, from one of the US
Savings Bonds programs from the early 1950s, is indicative of many examples of Cold War campaigns
organized around images of an external threat. Depicting a kind of simultaneity between personal and national
security, this image features a lone figure using his savings to fight a menacing Soviet presence. What is
striking in this image is the clear reference to a distinctive American identity. The real danger represented by
this external threat is not violence or blunt instruments of force, but rather the risk of losing a particular kind
of American identity dedicated to freedom and individualism. By figuring investment as a mode of action
capable of “hitting out at the enemies of our way of life,” the whole question of international threat becomes
connected to the intimate contours of American culture and values.
                                         
Figure 1: Hit Him Hard! and do Yourself a Favor19
American notions of national identity often hinge upon a discourse of American exceptionalism; a
sense of the special role ordained upon the American nation and the special form of obligation this entails
within the international realm. In the context of the Cold War American identity became squarely focussed
on the exceptional burden of American obligation to maintain and organize a free world. Internal American
values are required to meet this international obligation and yet are also threatened by forces external to the
nation. The advertising of popular financial vehicles (including of course those connected to US Savings and
Defence Bonds) often diagrams this exact kind of international obligation and exceptionalism. In one example
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from a Savings bonds series, the continuation of the ‘good American life’ is clearly (and perhaps most
fundamentally) connected to an almost unknowable amount of ‘trouble in foreign places.’ Maintaining
American identity entails an immense burden (‘its going to take some doing, starting right now’) in the
international realm. In this formulation American culture (the ‘kind of future we want’) is most clearly
defined in opposition to the instabilities and difficulties of ‘foreign’ space. This narrative develops an
equation between domestic culture/values and a particular requirement to respond to foreign ‘trouble’:
Sometimes I can’t understand all I see in the newspapers about trouble in foreign places. But
nowadays we can’t turn our backs on what’s happening somewhere else. The world’s too
small. If my youngsters are going to grow up to enjoy the good American life, it’s going to
take some doing, starting right now...the money goes toward keeping America’s guard up
and that’s mighty important, too, if there’s going to be the kind of future we want...Savings
Bonds are a kind of ’insurance policy’ for me and my country.20
Much of the advertising associated with these early forms of popular finance can be read, in these terms, as
artefacts of nation-ness; as places where this particular sense of nation (figured against geopolitical danger)
is made real in a range of everyday settings.  Because they are targeted explicitly to working-class or
everyday actors and because they draw connections between nation and danger with particular clarity, the
images of popular finance are a special location where a sense of American identity is made real and given
a particular resonance.
At another level, however, what is perhaps most striking about this connection between national and
geopolitical identity are the ways in which the risks central to individual economic security are often
conceived as internal to (part of the same moment as) the dangers of geopolitical space. The discourses of
economic citizenship both locate individuals directly within forms of economic risk and situate that form of
citizenship as the basis of how the nation bears itself in the context of international risk/danger.21  These
programs often diagram individual saving or investing as practices with which citizens could make
themselves active in the security of the nation. The capacity of the nation to bear itself in the context of
international life relies, in this view, on the self-governing capacities and conduct of its citizens. Everyday
actors, in this respect, are implicated directly and actively in the making of national space and in the ways
in which the nation is actualized as a strong and cohesive body. The ability of the nation to bear itself within
international space (and to confront its international obligations and dangers) is directly connected to
individual citizens and their capacities to bear and govern themselves in the little risks they face in economic
and financial life.
Another striking example (They Saved a Frontier for You…) is a set of advertising copy proofs from
the early postwar period providing advertisers with copyimages for use in local US Savings Bonds
campaigns. Here 6 images make visible the role of bonds in national development/consolidation (the national
railway, the expansion of national territory) and in the successful confrontation with external threats and
obligation (San Juan Hill, Okinawa, etc.). What is striking in many of these images is a connection which is
sought between these geopolitical dangers and an appropriate form of economic conduct capable of sustaining
the nation against these dangers. Savings bonds are depicted as a form of capital which accompanies and
animates — literally breathing life into — the dangerous struggle for national security in different contexts.
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The risk that everyday populations confront in pursuing individual financial security is also connected to the
risk states face and confront in global space. “Now it’s your turn,” the ad copy suggests, “to make America
grow” and to pursue individual security simultaneously.22
This discourse connecting individual practice (and individual self-government) with the broader
confrontations of geopolitical space is first hinted in some of the modes of economic citizenship associated
with nineteenth century imperialism. Attempts to promote thrift among the working class, for example, was
often directly figured in terms of geopolitical and imperial danger. Attempts to encourage working class
individuals to save and govern themselves in an appropriate manner (in this case to deny the passions of their
‘lower’ self23 is also an obligation to the nation. John Lubbock’s guidebook (1894) connects thrifty and self-
governing conduct with the unique dangers of imperial rule. For Lubbock the imperial nation is confronted
with a range of dangers including, most explicitly, the ‘magnitude and extent of our Empires’ and the
different ‘ideas and aspirations’ of the many races governed by the imperial nation. Confronting this danger
and allowing the nation to bear itself within global space, requires appropriate individual conduct (fitting
oneself for the ‘great responsibility’ of imperial governance). In this racist/orientalist formulation, making
ourselves ‘fit’ for imperial responsibilities and dangers is not only a question of preparing the nation and its
defences, but also a matter of citizenship and of appropriate forms of individual conduct. Thrifty self-
government and the management of colonial bodies are parts of the same equation of government and danger:
We are all part of the Government of this country, and one of the most important of our
duties is to fit ourselves for the great responsibility. This requires study and thought as well
as mere good-will. The very magnitude and extent of our Empires is itself a source of
danger. We govern many races of men, some of them with ideas and aspirations very
different from our own.24
This discourse which emphasizes the simultaneity of individual and national security, is also
articulated in many American twentieth century campaigns. The unique global dangers and obligations of
American leadership in the context of the Cold War and the postwar order require a particular kind of
individual conduct which is both consistent with and constitutive of this global leadership. Figure 2 (Is the
Island Shrinking) is a striking diagram of this kind of relationship. A part of an advertising supplement
produced directly by the Advertising Council in support of US Savings Bonds and related initiatives, this
depiction features an image of the Statue of Liberty, the shadow of which is a silhouette of the Kremlin tower.
This transfigured Statue of Liberty, made precarious by its own shadow, is framed by the single question ‘Is
the Island Shrinking?’ This question, which clearly invokes America’s responsibilities in the context of global
danger, is squarely answered in relation to individual conduct. Emphasizing themes of American
exceptionalism the text invokes the practice of freedom as an individualized practice key to successful
confrontations with international danger. The practice of freedom is located not in broad institutions but rather
in the action and conduct of individual citizens. “In the past, those tired of rule by force and hungry for rule
by reason looked to America because here everybody took part in government.” Government, in this
configuration, is a matter of individual conduct and practice; a democratic freedom of individual
responsibility. The government of the nation is ultimately reducible to the ways in which individual citizens
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govern themselves. Reminding individuals that ‘Freedom is Everybody’s Job,’ the text clearly connects the
fate of the nation (especially with respect to its international obligations) to the individual freedom practised
by its citizens; a practice of individual freedom available, for example, in prudent investing practices.  “Like
anything else that lives and has being and grows,” the text asserts, “Freedom itself withers and dies when not
practised by those who enjoy its privileges. Is the island shrinking in your own heart.” Making a direct appeal
to individuals, this image squarely formulates the question of national space and integrity as an issue of
appropriate individual conduct and practices of citizenship.
                                             
Figure 2: Is the Island Shrinking25
These themes are also present in the images produced directly by the US Savings Bond programs —
In in his hand, for example, a 1954 copy from the US Savings Bonds series, male obligation to and sacrifice
for the unspeaking members of his domestic space, is conceived not only as an act of family necessity, but
also one of national security. The requirement to save, here, is expressed as both an act of prudential
manliness as well as a godly act of national freedom and security. This is a formulation in which the ‘strength
of America’ is most visibly connected to the security provided by its individual citizens in the pursuit of their
own personal or (gendered) family obligations:
…the pattern is security, and it is Dad's privilege to supply his part of it for the little hearts
in his care…The security of our homes is our worthiest goal. And providing it is a privilege
unique in a country like ours…And think: The security that begins in your home, joined to
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that of other homes, builds the strength of America. Saving for Security is easy!…For your
sake, and your family’s, too, how about signing up today?26
An ‘intimate association’ is depicted in this formulation between the risk that the nation faces in
geopolitical space and the risks individuals directly confront by managing their own savings or investments
in a prudential manner. It is in these terms that those who sought to provoke certain forms of economic
citizenship, were also, and at the same time, pursuing a kind of geopolitical reasoning. These experts and
advocates were trying to strengthen the nation and its security by ‘making up’ an individual form of
citizenship capable of bearing/securing both individuals and the nations they populate. This ‘making up’ of
economic citizens — a project pursued in a variety of ways by a range of different actors — was more than
a merely economic pursuit. At the same time these projects were also a way to insert citizens into the nation
as a whole and a method with which individual citizens could become active in the government of themselves
and the nation — a way of securing the nation within the geopolitical spaces it inhabits.
Conclusion: Towards a Cultural Economy of Individual/Social/National Security
In many respects capital has always been connected to discourses of geopolitics or to forms of geopolitical
reasoning. Writing in 1866, Amasa Walker — one of the key contributors to the early field of political
economy in the American context — became preoccupied with defining capital, and the spaces it occupied,
in some clarity. For Walker capital is a world-historical force central to imperial conquest, international
adventurism or successful confrontation with ‘savage’ danger:
Capital…has gone abroad to colonize. It has carried on great wars in which it had no
interest…Capital has gone round the world in the same boat with the inspired discoverer. It
watched with Columbus the weeds drifting from an unknown land; it ‘stared at the Pacific’
by the side of stout Cortes; it debarked with the gallant Cook, nor was it frightened at the
savage violence which took his life…It freighted vessels for countries not named; it sent
fleets to ports never visited by civilized man.27
In this paper I have tried to delineate a different relationship between geopolitical reasoning and
economic knowledges/practices. The most central vector connecting economic and geopolitical practice that
I have foreground in this paper is a line that has often been drawn between the risk of individual economic
life and the danger the state confronts in geopolitical space. Not only, I have argued, is risk/danger central
to the ways in which both nations and economic citizens are constituted (relational identities given form only
in frames of identity/difference). In addition, and at a more complex level, I have also argued that these
seemingly different forms of risk/security are often deeply implicated in each other. The diverse experts,
authorities and activists who have tried to cultivate forms of economic citizenship over the past century have
often conceived of the risks inherent in those forms of citizenship as internal to or as deeply constitutive of
the nation and the ways in which the nation bears itself in the dangers of geopolitical space.
The full contours of this territory of economic risk and geopolitical danger are clearly more complex
than this paper could delineate. Rather, this paper has gestured at a few historical examples as a way of
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mapping out some of the broad outlines of this territory. By way of conclusion, I want to review three key
sets of questions that might provoke more detailed investigation and which might be usefully explored in
relation to this economic citizenship/geopolitical connection. First, and in general connection with the key
concerns of critical geopolitics, assessing the links between geopolitical and economic practice could help
further open and disrupt the concept of security. In particular, by investigating this relationship between
citizenship and geopolitical reasoning, more detailed accounts of the ways in which geopolitical and national
identity are inscribed in and lived in terms of daily life could be developed. Because programs of economic
citizenship — including the programs of popular finance reviewed in this paper — targeted themselves to
everyday, popular or working-class populations, they are particularly useful glimpses into the ways in which
geopolitical reasoning was lived and experienced for a particular audience. In addition, attention to economic
citizenship could also help provide a more ‘material’ or concrete focus to geopolitical ambitions and
identities. Critical geopolitics, and post-structuralist approaches more generally, are often accused of being
preoccupied with the play of language and with the determinant status of narrative, knowledge, or discourse.
A focus on programs concerned with economic citizenship, and on the concrete practices those programs seek
to cultivate, could help turn attention to the ways in which identities connected to geopolitical reasoning are
made real in a set of ‘material’ practices/techniques and within particular institutional contexts. This, in turn,
could deepen the connections between foreign policy analysis and the broader contours of critical and cultural
theory, including the agenda of cultural economy; an approach interested not only in the knowledges of
economic life but also in the techniques, practices and institutional networks in which those knowledges have
been made a practical reality or transformed into forms of practical ‘know-how.’
Second, more detailed elaboration of the connections between economic and geopolitical identity
could more precisely address the historical and contemporary connections between national and social
security. A key aspect of both critical and mainstream critiques of security throughout the last decade has
been an attempt to broaden the concept of security and its relation to a broad set of social and political
processes. Appeals to human security and ‘securitization,’ for example, have attempted to foreground the role
of security in a broader set of issues beyond national security (political, environmental, individual security)
and to develop a useful concept of ‘societal security.’28  Despite this broadening, however, there has been
little attention to the connections between economic forms of social security and national security. Barry
Buzan and Ole Weaver argue, for example, that economic issues are not frequently connected to or articulated
within the language or practices of security.29  As this paper has emphasized in only a cursory gesture,
however, economic and national security have often been riddled with deep forms of mutual-implication.
With more detailed inquiry into the links between economic citizenship and geopolitical identity, the
connections between national and social security could be sketched in more detail; a line of analysis key not
only to the broadening of the concept of security but also to the wide-ranging and urgent debates across many
contexts relating to social security reform.30
Third, and perhaps most importantly, more attention to the connections between economic and
geopolitical practices could help generate critical analyses of the increasingly complicated relations between
national security and the economic webs central to our globalized present. Although increasingly subject to
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and located within global economic spaces, articulating economic citizenship in terms of national security
remains a highly fertile pursuit. This has been only most visible in much of the national security discourse
mobilized in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Much of this national security discourse
mobilizes everyday economic conduct and citizenship as a force central to and deeply implicated in the
strength and security of the nation. Speaking on 20 September 2001 in an address to a joint session of
Congress, President Bush clearly links the response to ‘terror’ (a task itself critical to the confrontation with
geopolitical danger) to the economic conduct and enterprise of American citizens. “Terrorists attacked a
symbol of American prosperity,” Bush affirms in his speech, however “they did not touch its source. America
is successful because of the hard work and creativity and enterprise of our people. These were the true
strengths of our economy before September 11, and they are our strengths today.”31 It is this striking
formulation — a line of force connecting enterprise, citizenship and national security — which, even in our
seemingly globalized present, continues to exert a special if idiosyncratic kind of pressure over the contours
of political, economic, and geopolitical life.
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